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Some Newly Emergent Geographies of




This conversation examines the relationship between the boundaries
and borders in international aw and the production of geographies of
injustice through the lens of the colonial epistemologies, especially of
private international aw in the face of mass social disasters like the
archetypal Bhopal catastrophe. I also address the languages and logics
of coloniality and postcoloniality, as states of consciousness and social
organization, under the complex and contradictory unity of
neoliberalism.
INTRODUCTION
In this conversation, I focus on how geographies of human
rightlessnes are produced through law and jurisprudence. The
Anthropocene era now upon us challenges almost all basic premises of
human coexistence, though that constitutive notion is not free of
anxieties.' There is, however, no doubt that popular science, global
environmental policy and activism,2 and the media capture something
* Professor of Law in Development, University of Warwick. U.Baxi@warwick.ac.uk.
1. Technically, the International Commission on Stratigraphy is still working out
whether the term "Anthropocene," originally proposed by Paul Crutzen and Eugene
Stormer, constitutes a new and autonomous geological time, or an extension of the
Holocene period of time (which lasted over eleven thousand years). See Paul J. Crutzen,
The "Anthropocene," in EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE: EMERGING ISSUES
AND PROBLEMS 13, 13-16 (Ehlers et al. eds., 2006); Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind,
415 NATURE 23 (2002).
2. On December 12, 2015, 195 countries arrived at the final twelve-page document of
the Paris Agreement (the fuller title being the Paris Agreement under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change) to reduce emissions as part of the method for
reducing greenhouse gas. The members agreed to reduce their carbon output "as soon as
possible" and to do their best to keep global warming "to well below 2 degrees C." Already,
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important when they suggest hat the emission of greenhouse gases and
climate change exert "a decisive influence"3 on "the state, dynamics, and
the future of the Earth system."4 The popular readings as well as new
global social-change theory are not clear on what "responsibility" for
social and political action this may entail. Regardless of what geologists
187 nations had submitted, well before the Conference, detailed national plans for how
they will contain the rise in greenhouse gas emissions (core commitments of the Paris
deal). This "ambitious and balanced" scheme (in the words of French foreign minister
Laurent Fabius, the plan was a "historic turning point" in the goal of reducing global
warming. The Agreement will not become binding on its member states until fifty-five
parties who produce over 55% of the world's greenhouse gas have ratified the Agreement.
Each country that ratifies the agreement will be required to set a voluntary target for
emission reduction, though it remains to be seen whether some countries, especially the
United States, will agree to do so, in the light of-in the words of U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry-"a victory for all of the planet and for future generations," and-in the words
of President Obama--'Ve have set a course here. The world has come together around an
agreement that will empower us to chart a new path for our planet, a smart and
responsible path, a sustainable path." See Alister Doyle and Barbara Lewis, With
Landmark Climate Accord, World Marks Turn from Fossil Fuels, REUTERS (Dec 13, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-summit-idUSKBNOTVO4L20151213.
Alertly, and adroitly, many environmental and climate change proponent NGOs, and
others, have begun to criticize the Paris Pact, on various grounds: the voluntary character
of the treaty commitments (primarily through "Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions" (INDCs)), the relative absence of third party enforcement, the ambivalence
towards, or even the disappearance of, the principle of "common but differentiated
responsibility," and even the projected pace of treaty finalization (the "global stocktake,"
which revisits the national goals to "update and enhance" them every five years beginning
in 2023). No doubt the fine print of this deal will be subjected to critical analyses in the
near future; already a minority of academics have sounded a note of caution against an
international treaty. See Jane McAdam, Swimming Against he Tide: Why a Climate
Change Displacement Treaty is Not the Answer, 23 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 2 (2011). Drawing
on field work in Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Bangladesh, and maintaining a distinction between
"legal" and "political" benefits, McAdam "queries the utility - and, importantly, the policy
consequences - of pinning 'solutions' to climate change-related displacement on a
multilateral instrument, in light of the likely nature of movement, the desires of
communities affected by it, and the fact that a treaty will not, without wide ratification
and implementation, 'solve' the humanitarian issues." Id. See also Jane McAdam and Ben
Saul, An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced Displacement and
International Law, in HUMAN SECURITY AND NON-CITIZENS: LAW, POLICY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 357 (Alice Edwards & Carla Ferstman eds., 2010).
3. These terms originate from the language of the working group established to study
the potential of the Anthropocene as a new geological era. See Working Group on the
'Anthropocene'." What is the 'Anthropocene? - Current Definitions and Status,
Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy, SUBCOISSION ON QUATERNARY STRATIGRAPHY
(May 5, 2015), http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/.
4. See generally Upendra Baxi, Judging Emmanuel Levinas? Some Reflections on
Reading Levinas, Law, Politics, 72 MOD. L. REV. 116 (2009) (reviewing a collection of
pieces that explore Levinas' work on contemporary legal and jurisprudential theory and
its interpretation); see also Upendra Baxi, Towards Climate Justice, 7 J. HUM. RTS. &
ENV'T (forthcoming 2016).
BOUNDARIES AND BORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
will eventually do with the Anthropocene, Naomi Klein has recently
spoken on behalf of many by calling us to think of our planet anew-as
a planet in distress; as a world where political and ideological borders
and boundaries make no sense, and old loyalties need to be overthrown
and replaced with a newly configured and urgent ethic of life for all.5
Perhaps this means that we must, with Jacques Derrida, rethink the
question of responsibility as response-ability6-as openness to the
suffering of the other, or, more precisely, to the face of the other, as
Emmanuel Levinas used to say.
The theory and practice of international law have witnessed several
paradigm shifts: from Westphalian to post-Westphalian statehood, from
feminist to postmodern images of the state, and from visions of
colonialism and imperialism to visions of universal equal human rights
and global justice. As global citizens, we ourselves have witnessed many
transitions: from the colonial to the postcolonial; from the bourgeois to
socialist; from the first to a second, third, and a fourth world; from
classical liberalism to contemporary "neoliberalism"; from global wars of
terror to global wars on terror. The social invention of international,
supranational, and regional organizations and the idea of human rights
have radically changed the world's expectations from, and experiences
of, international law, relations, and organizations. International law no
longer merely talks in the languages of positive law; it also converses in
the languages of human rights and justice. To fully understand these
changes is a huge task for which an inquiry into the changing
"boundaries of statehood" provides a new and interesting prism. In this
context, we must recall that boundaries and borders are set not just by
changing historical realties but also by conceptual distinctions. The
latter delineate both the empirical and the juridical in the very concept
of the state in international law.7 The late Westphalian-era Montevideo
Convention on Rights and Duties of States defined statehood in terms of
5. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE
CLIMATE (2014). There are many ways to read this admirable work, which is designed to
foster activist knowledge, legality, justice, and solidarity among suffering and struggling
peoples of the earth. It is especially important as conveying a vivid description of the
tactics pursued by neoliberal markets and governments-especially job blackmail,
"desperation" as means to predation, and "total control." See id. at 388-488, for sage
counsel.
6. See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE GIFT OF DEATH & LITERATURE IN SECRET 20, 68-70
(David Wills trans., Univ. Chi. Press. 2008) (1999).
7. For an excellent analysis of the concept of the state, see Robert H. Jackson & Carl
G. Rosberg, Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in
Statehood, 35 WORLD POLITICS 1, 4 (1982); Lee J.M. Seymour, Sovereignty, Territory and
Authority: Boundary Maintenance in Contemporary Africa, 5 CRITICAL AFR. STUD. 17, 17-
21, 29 (2013).
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the following attributes: (a) a defined territory, (b) a permanent
population, (c) an effective government, and (d) independence, or the
right "to enter into relations with other states."8 This definition
eminently suited the state practice of the customary "family of nations"
approach adopted by Europe and United States of America and was not
abandoned until the scattered decolonization of the Third World.
Before the process of European integration, which the Montevideo
Convention reflected and codified, a key ingredient of "the state" was
"effective government"-a condition that, by definition, was lacking in
most countries subject to colonization and Western imperialism.9 We
have only to mention, by way of an example, the long state practice
attesting to the constitutive nature of state recognition. As has been
provocatively observed,
[t]he crisis of the modern nation state is that the
exception is everywhere becoming the rule. We
increasingly live in a time where populations' ontological
status as legal subjects is suspended. The failure of laws
that govern citizenship marks a decisive turning point in
the life of the modern nation-state and a definitive
emancipation from the naive notions of "people" and
"citizen."10
8. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-77 (3d ed. 1979).
9. Postcolonial states were definitionally incapable of effective government because
decolonization per se robbed decolonized states of their capacity for effective governance
and because effective governance was itself defined in such a way as to exclude
postcolonial states.
10. Sari Hanafi, The Broken Boundaries of Statehood and Citizenship, 2 BORDERLANDS
E-JOURNAL, Dec. 2003, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol2no3_2003/hanafi boundaries.
htm. See also MICHELLE L. BURGIS, BOUNDARIES OF DISCOURSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE: MAPPING ARGUMENTS IN ARAB TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (2009)
(analyzing the extent to which international law can be used to speak for and speak to
non-European experiences of authority over territory). The concept of territoriality has
been refigured, with deep insight, into that of "assemblages." See SASKIA SASSEN, A
SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 45-96 (2007) (discussing the sets of processes that make up
globalization for the Westphalian structure of the state); SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY,
AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 1-24, 378-424 (4th prtg.,
2008) (discussing how the national state made today's global era possible). See generally
James Thuo Gathii, Geographical Hegelianism in Territorial Disputes Involving Non-
European Land Relations: An Analysis of the Case Concerning KasikililSedudu Island
(Botswana/Namibia), in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER: LAW, POLITICS,
AND GLOBALIZATION 75 (Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003) (arguing that the International
Court of Justice's decision concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island exemplifies "geographical
Hegelianism"); Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Mapping the Lawscape: Spatial
Law and the Body, in THE ARTS AND THE LEGAL ACADEMY: BEYOND TEXT IN LEGAL
BOUNDARIES AND BORDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Territoriality and jurisdiction are the very bases of international
law, international organizations and institutions, and lived
international life. Even in a post-Westphalian era, territorial
boundaries and borders are often treated as constitutive facts in the
formation of "national" identities and cultures. However, the boundaries
and borders of modern international law are mostly colonial in origin,
and the principle of self-determination is not merely averse to, but has
also generated, many boundary disputes in the Third World.11 While the
idea of a world without borders has resurfaced as an idea of justice, the
human rights plights of immigrants and refugees continue to tell
chilling stories about states' lethal sovereignties.
But it is no longer tenable to maintain that states are fully
sovereign subjects of international law, while the people enclosed in
their borders are mere objects of international law. States as political
entities are surrounded everywhere by nonstate actors. While these
actors vary generally in size, resources, agenda, and impact, and
particularly in their disposition or capacity to influence future events,
many of them (including multinational corporations and human-rights
social-action groups) wield power and influence previously unimagined.
Against this background, the article focuses on the production of new
geographies of injustice, the ways of their creation and perpetuation,
and the means of resistance against them. It explores the following
related issues concerning the production, distribution, exchange, and
consumption of spaces and places: the role of private international law
in the production of places of human rightlessness; and the role of
postcoloniality (in particular Third Worldism) as a mentality of the legal
and political organization of space. These two themes are conceptually
and normatively related though distinct; intersecting as well as
relatively autonomous.
EDUCATION 119 (Zenon Badkowski et al. eds., 2012) (discussing different approaches to
law's assemblage and "discovery").
11. See, e.g., John Agnew, The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of
International Relations Theory, 1 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 53, 53 (1994) (asserting that "the
clear spatial demarcation of the territory," within which sovereignty is exercised, provides
an essential component of political theory definitions of the state); see also MALCOLM
ANDERSON, FRONTIERS: TERRITORY AND STATE FORMATION IN THE MODERN WORLD 1-36
(1996) (describing hegemonic aspects of historical and modern importance of frontiers); see
also ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); see also JERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL
SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2004); see also Brian Taylor Sumner,
Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L. J. 1779 (2004).
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I. GEOGRAPHIES OF INJUSTICE
The notion of "geographies of injustice" emerged in the early
nineties from a group of interdisciplinary scholars at the University of
New York Law School's Centre for Study of Law and Society. David
Harvey coined a sister term, the "geographies of difference," to describe
colonial and capitalist geographical knowledge production.12 Harvey
furnished the insight that politics, democratic or otherwise, consist of
control over and production of "space," requiring students of politics to
study and understand how "places get erected into permanencies within
the flux and flow of capital circulation."'13 This understanding of politics
as a struggle for control and mastery over things and people through the
acquisition and maintenance of power is contrasted with an
understanding of the "political" as the art of resistance to power and as
the language of hope. "Geographies of injustice," in an allied way and
across a range of transformations and interventions, arise out of the
many contradictions of capitalism, especially those that are "moving,"
that is, that are "not stable or permanent but perpetually changing
[their] spots"; and those moving contradictions "morph[ ] into a
contradiction that necessarily gets internalized within anti-capitalistic
politics."'14 Put another way, if modern human rights norms and
standards provide benchmarks for governance and development, it is
their betrayal in practice which gives and restores their normative
strength. 15
Many forms of tyranny and ideas concerning governance and
development have one thing in common: that peculiar set of
arrangements and institutions of injustice, which have at their core the
willful denial of basic human and social rights that causes and
perpetuates conditions and circumstances of human rightlessness. It
produces aggregates of worst-off peoples, often regarded as "disposable"
12. See DAVID HARVEY, JUSTICE, NATURE AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF DIFFERENCE 334-65
(1996). Harvey's analysis remains indebted to Henri Lefebvre but traverses much beyond
this. See Upendra Baxi, Human Rights Responsibility of Multinational Corporations,
Political Ecology of Injustice: Learning from Bhopal Thirty Plus?, 1 BUS. & HuM. RTS. J. 21
(2016).
13. HARVEY, supra note 12, at 295.
14. DAVID HARVEY, SEVENTEEN CONTRADICTIONS AND THE END OF CAPITALISM 101,
111 (2014).
15. See generally UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) (discussing
the nature of human rights, the myths embedded in them, and the contemporary effects
that globalization has on the human rights movement); NIKLAS LUHMANN, A
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Martin Albrow ed., Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow
trans., 1985) (exploring the concept of law in the context of a general theory of social
systems and its role in solving societal problems).
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or "pre-social," that emerge variously in the changing faces of
development as a means of inclusion and exclusion, and consensus as
well as dissensus on the nature of justice and injustice in society. The
"arts of governance" (as Michel Foucault once termed them16) render the
suffering of these peoples invisible. And yet these very peoples possess
the dialectical powers of struggle and resistance from which the new
political springs.17 It is paradoxical but true that the present neoliberal
era,18 like all others, is marked by a dialectic between the powerful and
the powerless. While this dialectic is situated in space as well as time, it
is customary to conceptualize it in terms of history rather than
geography, though the spatial turn in the social sciences and the law
has partly reversed this tendency.19
II. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENTIAL
PLACE
There are many ways to understand the "dull compulsion" of law,
20
but we need to first turn to the geographies of law and rightlessness.
While much has been written of late about the former,21 we need to
16. Michel Foucault referred to the questions that "exploded" the European discourse
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a  centering upon '[H]ow to govern oneself,
how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed,
how to become the best possible governor." See Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE
FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87 (Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, &
Pete Miller eds., 1991). For Foucault, the performance of biopolitics required that "one
never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those whom one governs are
people, individuals, or groups." See Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population:
Lectures at the Collge de France, 1977-1978, at 122 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., 2007).
17. See, e.g., JENS BARTELSON, VISIONS OF WORLD COMMUNITY (2009); Mark Bevir,
Rethinking Governmentality: Towards Genealogies of Governance, 13 EUR. J. OF SOC.
THEORY 423 (2010); Mark Bevir, Governance and Governmentality After Neoliberalism, 39
POL'Y & POL. 457 (2011); JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY? (2003); COMPLEX
SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly, eds., 2005); BAXI, supra note 15, at 234-272.
18. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE
COLLftGE DE FRANCE, 1978-1979 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., Picador
2010) (describing neoliberal governmentality); HARVEY, supra note 12.
19. Compare FOUCAULT, supra note 18 (detailing neoliberalism from the eighteenth to
twentieth centuries), with HARVEY, supra note 12 (detailing the space, place, and
geography of difference).
20. Marx characterized capital in this manner. KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 809 (Friedrich Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans.,
Dover 2011) (1906).
21. See, e.g., EVE DARIAN-SMITH, LAWS AND SOCIETIES IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS:
CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (2013) (situating socio-legal perspectives into global contexts
and traditions). See generally NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES
OF POWER (1994) (arguing that the geographies of law have a profound, and often
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augment the latter. Here I engage with the doctrine and practice of
private international law (PIL),22 my first love in law.23 The dominant
Euro-American discourse, which hardly allows any space for Southern
voices, is marked by a certain kind of epistemic social contract which
contains several fundamental stipulations. Being private law, PIL must
serve the overwhelming need to pursue uniformity, certainty, and
predictability ("decisional harmony"). Being private makes PIL immune
to the higher reaches of the discourses of jurisprudence (grappling with
the conditions for the production of what Jilrgen Habermas calls
oppressive, impact on individuals and proposing new ways to monitor this impact);
HARVEY, supra note 12; HARVEY, supra note 14; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond
Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges, EUROZINE (June 29,
2007), http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-29-santos-en.html (arguing modern
Western ideology divides the "human" from the "sub-human"); Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, If God Were a Human Rights Activist: Human Rights and the Challenge of
Political Theologies, 2009 L. SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. (March 11, 2009),
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2009_1/santos/santos.pdf (contending that
pluralist and progressive theologies may produce more ambitious, counter-hegemonic
human rights struggles); Jos6-Manuel Barreto, Epistemologies of the South and Human
Rights: Santos and the Quest for Global and Cognitive Justice, 21 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 395 (2014) (exploring human rights theory through the lens of Santos' philosophy);
Walter D. Mignolo, The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference, 101 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 57 (2002); (arguing that the geopolitics of knowledge organizes around
diversification through the history of colonial and imperial differences); Edward Soja,
Afterword, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1421 (1996) (offering a critical geographical perspective on the
redefinition of law and borders); Robert R.M. Verchick, Critical Space Theory: Keeping
Local Geography in American and European Environmental Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 739
(1999) (discussing the legal significance of geography in relation the environmental issues
of transborder waste transportation and judicial standing).
22. A comprehensive history of the politics of naming the field of "private international
law" or "conflicts of laws" is yet to be written. All I wish to assert here is that even when
primarily the handiwork of jurists, private international law is an instrument of colonial
and postcolonial hegemony and now neoliberal dominance. See, e.g., A. Claire Cutler, New
Constitutionalism, Democracy, and the Future of Global Governance, in CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REIMAGINING THE FUTURE 89
(Stephen Gill ed., 2015) (arguing that the relationship between the private and public
sectors be viewed through the lens of democracy and capitalism); Scott Sinclair, Trade
Agreements and Progressive Governance, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE CRISIS OF
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REIMAGINING THE FUTURE 110 (Stephen Gill ed., 2015) (discussing
governance through international means such as through trade, boundaries, and
regulation).
23. I was taught in Bombay to learn rules and doctrines and, later, to critically and
comparatively analyze them in Berkley (under the guidance of Albert Ehrenzweig). I
began to approach private international law from the perspective of comparative social
theory of law and jurisprudence much later. It was David Harvey's work that directed me
to more fully attend to the production/reproduction of space through the doctrines of
private international law.
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"legitimate law"),24 political theory (notably, issues of consent and
obligation), and ethics (whether deontological or consequentialist).
Being international aw, PIL largely disregards the human rights of the
individual, as its doctrines and practices are almost wholly concerned
with "comity" among nations. Only very recently have these aspects
begun to be addressed in terms of ethics and political theory. Yet on
both sides of the Atlantic, benign indifference rather than active
intellectual insurgency greets the challenges arising from such critique.
Attempts to redirect the PIL tradition to issues of human, and
human rights, violations remain fragmented and contested. Some
progress is visible, for example, in conflicts of family law, where it is no
longer considered just or appropriate to follow archaic maxims like "the
domicile of the wife follows that of her husband," which for a long time
enabled the flourishing of an extraordinary regime of "limping"
marriages and "quickie" divorces. Generally, however, significant
obstacles impede progress. The indeterminate category of "public policy"
has often been recruited to terminate long-held patterns of PIL-
sustained legality. But public policy cannot "trump" competing claims as
rights do. Moreover, judges take only half-seriously the general
doctrinal understanding that "public policy" should be invoked as a way
to avoid the application of foreign law or the recognition of a foreign
judgment only where the foreign system has produced juridical content
which is repugnant to, not simply different from, the fundamental legal
values of the forum. The much-vaunted distinction between
"repugnance" and "difference" cannot support absolute multinational
enterprise liability (urged by India in the Bhopal case) because such
Southern "difference" will almost always generate Northern
"repugnance." Further, less formalistic and more policy-oriented (and
occasionally human-rights-friendly) decisions have not led to any
profound changes in the dominant tradition. The mainstream view still
holds that the protection, promotion, and preservation of human rights
should not be pursued via private international law-a discipline
already heavily burdened by doctrinal twists and turns in pursuit of
what are considered its core objectives (uniformity, certainty, and
predictability or "decisional harmony").
The mainstream view has served rather well the needs of colonial
capitalism and the interests of foreign investors in these halcyon days of
globalization. However, the processes of globalization of law embody, in
complex and contradictory ways, not just the power of global capital, but
also the power of resistance to it. It is the latter which makes many
24. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996).
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aspects of the dominant PIL tradition problematic in its fashioning
regimes of impunity for human wrongs committed in the course of
international trade and business. The dominant tradition increasingly
confronts challenges to its legitimacy, especially in cases of mass
disasters and socially disastrous toxic torts. Yet this social criticism
continues to remain external to PIL doctrine, and is liable to summary
dismissal from an internal standpoint. Human rights and social
activists have begun, at least since the Bhopal catastrophe,
25 to
understand that the inner dynamic of PIL constitutes an obstacle to the
promotion, protection, and preservation of human rights. But the
mystery and mystique of PIL protect the epistemic insularity of its
constructs: forum non conveniens, comity, jurisdiction in personam and
in rem, professio juris stipulations, lex fori, lex loci delicti, and even the
seemingly flexible "public policy." These are coated in a historical and
dogmatic opacity as yet impermeable to an activist gaze. It is small
consolation for activist communities that these constructs also mystify
PIL practitioners, who light many a candle at their shrines.
One thing remains clear: cursing the heart of conflict-of-laws
darkness by way of human rights lamentation does not quite seem to
help its eminent practitioners or advance causes dear to human-rights
and social-activist constituencies, at least not yet. The field's epistemic
insularity, nurtured by the PIL practitioners since the Middle Ages, has
25. See generally Upendra Baxi, Human Rights: Suffering Between Movements and
Market, in GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 33 (Robin Cohen & Shirin M. Rai eds., 2000)
(discussing the change in human rights norms following various catastrophes); Upendra
Baxi, The "Just War" for Profit and Power: The Bhopal Catastrophe and the Principle of
Double Effect, in RESPONSIBILITY IN WORLD BUSINESS: MANAGING HARMFUL SIDE-EFFECTS
OF CORPORATE ACTIVITY 175 (Lene Bomann-Larsen & Oddny Wiggin eds., 2004)
(suggesting that viewing transnational corporate governance through the correcting
principle of double effect standard might avoid future catastrophes like Bhopal); Upendra
Baxi, Whose Conflicts? What Law?, in 276 RECUEIL DES COURS 305 (1999) (focusing on the
implication of mass disasters on private international law); FRANK PEARCE & STEVE
TOMBS, TOXIC CAPITALISM: CORPORATE CRIME AND THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY (1998)
(analyzing the chemical industry from the perspective of its catastrophic accidents);
INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE, INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE
BHOPAL CASE, (Upendra Baxi ed., 1986) (criticizing Judge Keenan's ruling that India is an
adequate forum in the Bhopal litigation); INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE, MASS DISASTERS AND
MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (Upendra Baxi & Thomas Paul eds., 1986)
(listing the litigation documents prepared for the case of the Union of India against the
Union Carbide Corporation of the United States); INDIAN LAw INSTITUTE, VALIANT
VICTIMS AND LETHAL LITIGATIONS: THE BHOPAL CASE (Upendra Baxi & Amita Dhanda
eds., 1990) (showing the proceedings of the Bhopal catastrophe case throughout various
courts and venues); See also Frank Pearce & Steve Tombs, Crimes of the Powerful and
Insurgent Resistance: An Introduction, CRIMETALK, http://www.crimetalk.org.ukindex.
php?option=com-content&view-article&id= 174:open-space&catid=40&Itemid=50 (last
updated Feb. 3, 2012).
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been geared towards creating a province of law that is capable of
providing a series of pragmatic answers to specific problems posed by
transborder movements of capital, and by human movement that occurs
largely as some kind of byproduct of the structures of capital flow and
resulting wealth allocation. Since these structures and flows cause
"mass torts" that affect the life chances and quality of life of First World
denizens, conflicts' pragmatism entails incremental doctrinal
innovation, both at the level of lex fori application and of the
international treaty regimes, especially under the auspices of the Hague
Conference initiatives to codify private international law.26 One must,
indeed, remain grateful for these small PIL mercies.
PIL is inherently and overwhelmingly spatial, conditioned by space
and in turn constitutive of it, though not quite so recognized by scholars
and courts. It is important to return to its default setting, the "spatial
fixes" it builds on in order to reinforce its conceptual universe. PIL
hermeneutics remains tethered to the idea of separate but equal spheres
of state sovereignty. This already determines the limits of PIL justice,
which cannot reach "an overaccumulation of capital within a particular
geographical area" and "the uneven insertion of different territories and
social formations into the capitalist world market."27 Thus arise the
geographies of injustice peculiar to PIL adjudication. The protection of
the interests of global capital, however internally conflicted, requires
that tort liability be localized at the place of the commission of injury
and be governed by the law of that place (the lex loci delicti). That place
26. See Hans van Loon, The Hague Conference on Private International Law 2 HAGUE
JUST. J. (2007); Reid Mortensen, The Hague and the Ditch: The Trans-Tasman Judicial
Area and the Choice of Court Convention, 5 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 213 (2009).
27. David Harvey, The Geography of Class Power, 34 SOCIALIST REG. 49, 49. See also
HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE URBAN REVOLUTION 35 (Univ. of Minnesota Press ed., Robert
Bononno trans., 2003) (1970). But cf. NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF
DISASTER CAPITALISM (2007) (discussing the rise of capitalism in the face of war and
natural disasters). See generally GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY:
MONEY, POWER AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIMES (1994) (tracing the relationship between
capitalism and state formation over a 700 year period); ROBERT BRENNER, THE BOOM AND
THE BUBBLE: THE US IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2003) (discussing the U.S. economy in the
contexts of the global and world capitalist economies); 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, Useless to
Revolt?, in POWER 449 (James D. Faubion ed., Robert Hurley et al. trans., The New Press
2000) (1994) (explaining the implications of the Iranian revolution on Iranian society);
DAVID HARVEY, THE LIMITS TO CAPITAL (Verso 2006) (1982) (discussing the role of
"fictitious capital" in the "turmoil" in world markets and the resulting "uneven
geographical development"); DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2003) (examining the
role of "new" imperialism in capitalist markets); NEIL SMITH, THE ENDGAME OF
GLOBALIZATION (2005) (studying the imperialist thrust of the United States and its
neoliberal venture into global markets); MAPPING IDEOLOGY (Slavoj 2 i~ek ed., 2012)
(demonstrating the ways in which various ideologies affect cultural theory and political
practice).
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is the country of the state where the factory or the plant is located, often
in the global South. Toxic and hazardous industry and production by
entrepreneurs from the world's affluent regions, and increasingly
located in the world's low- and middle-income regions, thereby receives
a PIL incentive and bonus. The legal liability for harm caused by these
activities is judged by the judicial institutions of "host" countries and by
their legal standards, usually underdeveloped for a whole range of
reasons which cannot be fully explored here.
Rather than being the product of a fair-minded and decent theory or
practice, PIL adjudication reinforces the social vulnerability of victims
of human rights violations caused by the greater forensic ability and the
unconstitutional staying power of global corporations. To complete the
picture, add to this unconscionably lower damage awards to the violated
as compared with those awarded to similarly-situated victims in the
developed countries under the PIL determination of the substantive
laws applicable to the dispute. This arrangement is scarcely affected by
the growth of new technologies.28 The more routine are the planned,
cost-efficient corporate investment practices, fully sensitive only to the
burdens that the insurance industry may "legitimately" bear, which
authorizes risks that result in the kinds of social disasters and mass
torts of which the Bhopal catastrophe is the archetype.
The extant regime of conflictual tort liability presents and provides
an inestimable subsidy for doing hazardous business abroad (that is, in
the global South). Conflict of laws thrives amidst the realms of "real"
and "imagined" geographies.29 The "real" space of mass disasters, the
constitutive geographies of injustice, is at once local and global. It is
local in terms of the violation of actually existing human beings, and in
terms of the events and environments that shape their suffering; it is
global in its production of spaces and structures of suffering of global
scope. In contrast, the abstract conceptual geography of PIL creates a
distinctive space of its own through the invocation of what I have called
"the three Cs" (competence, comity, and convenience), which bear little
28. Consider how, for example, PIL adjudication generated a whole new order of
thought and practice concerning choice of law and venue for adjudication when confronted
by air crashes and disasters, given the possibility of maintaining a dual (let alone
multiple) conflicts regime of tort liability at high altitudes. As a result, a new public
international law regime emerged, partially obviating the PIL anarchy. For example, the
Space Objects Convention now determines the liability arising out of falling satellites or
other objects launched in outer space, almost wholly removing the issues arising from
traditional private international theory and practice. But, these are exceptional
happenings.
29. See Walter Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1303, 1310 (1982).
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or no relation to the empirical global and local spaces of mass
disasters.30
Much has changed in the theory and practice of the law, but the
theory and practice of PIL largely remain cocooned in some sort of
"time-warp." PIL adjudicatory practice in relation to mass torts has not
quite been able to emerge from its colonial episteme into a world
radically decolonized, at least at the formal level. The doctrinal
formation of PIL has been similarly unable to grasp the reality of a
"global risk society" that hazardous industries pose risks that do not
respect national boundaries or ideological frontiers, and ensure no
specific immunities for the overdeveloped societies. The trinity of
disasters that occurred within the space of twenty-three months in
1984-1986 (Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Sandoz conflagration) fully
illustrate this fact.
The risks thus posed by global industries menace human rights
everywhere, but this has not been a major concern of the dominant
discourse. This is demonstrated by the successful invocations by
multinational corporations of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, even
in the context of the supposedly human-rights-friendly United States
Alien Torts Act. 31 The colonial episteme, exemplified in its pure state by
AV Dicey's argumentation in 1896,32 resonates as late as 1982 in a
British court's oft-quoted description of foreign plaintiffs suing in the
United States courts: "As a moth is drawn to a light, so is a litigant
drawn to the United States."33 Alien victims suffering from grievous
corporate negligence and harm stand assimilated to "moths." This
entomological jurisprudence denies the victim's agency and dignity,
being genetically programmed first to victimhood by predatory global
capital and ultimately to denial of justice by Euro-American courts. The
"light" to which the "moths" flock, and which ultimately destroys them,
is the glow of PIL orthodoxies. Of course, when the victims of
multinational predation are conationals, that "light" suddenly provides
an illuminating arc of justice, as in the Agent Orange case where the
laudable desire to accomplish justice for the American Vietnam war
30. See Baxi, Whose Conflicts? What Law?, in 276 RECUEIL DES COURS, supra note 25,
at 338-64.
31. But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659, 1672 (2013) (Breyer,
J., concurring); Ingrid Wuerth, The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute: Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Vand. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 13-26, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.comabstract=2264323 (discussing
Kiobel in detail).
32. See ALBERT VENN DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW AND PUBLIC
OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Richard VandeWetering ed.,
2008).
33. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (A.C.) at 733 (Eng.).
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veterans led Judge Weinstein to even deny the existence of independent
legal systems of sovereign states.34 Thus, the famous hypothesis of
"cultural lag," according to which the adaptive technology of common
law (here PIL) lags behind human violation caused by technological
development.35 But it would be a major error to regard this simply as a
problem of the law's vaunted cultural lag. Rather, this lag is itself an
integral part of PIL's original intent.
The Bhopal catastrophe36 offers a cameo of the impunity of
multinational corporations. We need to think of the Bhopal catastrophe
in terms of cross-border nomadic practices of multinational corporate
"terror." The United Nations has now begun to describe "terrorism" as a
political project in which nonstate, yet state-like, actors deploy
asymmetrical and indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians
with the aim to overawe lawfully elected governments or to transform
state policies.37 As we condemn insurgent violence everywhere on the
planet, we should begin to think of ways in which "terrorist" forms of
corporate governance may at least be held answerable to indictments of
crimes against humanity. Warren Anderson does not compare with
Osama bin Laden, yet those suffering from Bhopal are indeed close
cousins of the victims of the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center
attacks and of the November 11, 2008 Mumbai attacks. How may we
name and think through the commonalities and differences between
these critical events for the benefit of a suffering humanity in a
hyperglobalizing world? As Marx wrote in 1850, profound social
transformation occurs only at the point of confluence of two events:
34. See generally In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (litigation arising out of Vietnam veterans' exposure to Agent Orange
herbicide).
35. See William Ogburn, Cultural Lag as Theory, 41 SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL RESEARCH,
167; see also WILLIAM OGBORN, ON CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1964).
36. See sources cited supra note 25.
37. For working approaches to terrorism in the U.N. system, see the official website:
UNITED NATIONS ACTION TO COUNTERTERRORISM, www.un.org/en/terrorism (last visited
Dec. 30, 2015); see also "Making the World Safe for Democracy"- UN Secretary Council
Resolution 1373, the International Imposition of Counterterrorism Policies, and the
"Arenas of Power" Model, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, available at http://blogs.cornell.edu/
policyreview/2012/03/15/making-the-world-safe-for-democracy-un-security-council-
resolution- 1373-the-international-imposition-of-counterterrorism-policies-and-the-arenas-
of-power-model/; RICHARD FALK, THE COSTS OF WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE UN, AND
WORLD ORDER AFTER IRAQ (2007); Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN
Security Council's Anti-terrorism Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17
EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 881 (2007).
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when thinking humanity remains capable of suffering and the suffering
humanity begins to think.
38
III. THIRD WORLDISM
My second theme is "Third Worldism," both as a form of social
organization and as a state of consciousness. This is a vast theme with
many complex histories, and I only briefly highlight a few features. The
complex social organization of colonialism was framed mainly by
European colonizers-their missionaries as well as their mercenaries-
who expropriated lands, territories, resources, and people for their own
ends and the ends of an overseas empire. This wave of conquest
globalization39 led to different narratives of combined and uneven
development. Not merely was conquest globalization held justified (in
terms of means-end rationality) and justifiable (as spreading
emancipation and human rights among the conquered and colonized),
but also gradually but determinedly linked to an emerging order of
international trade and commerce and the discipline of "free" market
competition.
The Third World was also constituted in part by the histories of the
Cold War.40 The Westphalian era is marked by several things long
familiar to historians and international lawyers.41 First, a slow,
38. The precise words from Karl Marx in the letter to Arnold Ruge are as follows: 'The
longer the time that events allow to thinking humanity for taking stock of its position, and
to suffering mankind for mobilising its forces, the more perfect on entering the world will
be the product that the present time bears in its womb." See KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, Letters from the Deutsch-Franz6sische Jahrbiicher, in 3 MARX AND ENGELS
COLLECTED WORKS, 1843-1844 (1844).
39. See Upendra Baxi, The Renascent Access Notions: Globalization and Access to
Justice, in JUSTICE FOR THE POOR: PERSPECTIVES ON ACCELERATING ACCESS 72, 77-78
(Ayesha Kadwani Dias & Gita Honwana Welch eds., 2009) (explaining the most enduring
form of globalization as that of the conquest of territories, peoples, resources, and the
futures of peoples).
40. See, e.g., EDUARDO GALEANO, OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF
THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT 75-78 (Cedric Belfrage tran., Serpent's Trail 2009) (1971)
(detailing the negative impact that the Cold War conflict between the United States and
the Soviet Union had on the economy of Cuba);VIJAY PRASHAD, THE DARKER NATIONS: A
PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE THIRD WORLD (Howard Zinn ed., 2007) (describing the
globalizing conditions of numerous postcolonial nations following the second World War);
VIJAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS: A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 78-79
(2012) (showing the impact of the machinations of the Cold War on the economy of the
Global South).
41. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
(Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012) (discussing the evolution of, as well as the
key dates and historical figures involved in, the changing discourse within international
law).
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meandering, but sure consolidation of European state sovereignty as
extended outwards towards overseas territorial possessions. Second, as
an emanation of this sovereignty, the emergence of colonial
international law that applied only as long as the "civilized nations"
consented to it. Third, the redrawing of territorial boundaries and
borders during the Age of Empire, without even a show of consent of
affected peoples, and the reign of unequal treaties. Fourth, the colonial
re-invention of the practices of desubjectification, reflected in the
category of "disposable peoples," conceptions of conquest and settlement,
and the divine right to rule the non-Euro-American other. Fifth, the
withholding of the Enlightenment universals (such as freedom and
rights) from the colonized peoples, who were infamously described by
Charles de Gaulle as "dust of the empire."42 Finally, the flourishing of
colonial governance and development that produced and reproduced the
loyal subject and the docile colonial body-by force of arms as well as by
hegemonic rule. Biopolitical power, as we now know it, was invented
and nearly perfected during colonial regimes.
It is only with the practices of resistance in the course of the wars of
independence and national liberation movements that the real history of
the principle of self-determination began. The inchoate proclamations
and enunciations of aspirational and enforceable human rights did not
overcome the "Third World's" desire for freedom. This was not a pale
imitation of the Western ideologies of liberal rule. The process of
decolonization of territories from foreign yoke (as, for example, the U.N.
narratives of associate members43) has a long history and is by no
means complete. That process emerges as a more complex story when
we include the histories of popular militant, and even armed, protests
by insurgent subjects and by predatory state sovereigns against
boundaries and borders drawn by colonial powers: the inner history of
self-determination movements deserves as much historical attention as
the boundary disputes among the formerly colonial states.
I call particular attention to "Third Worldism" as a state of social
consciousness surviving political decolonization by the imperial
42. KARL E. MEYER, THE DUST OF EMPIRE: THE RACE FOR MASTERY IN THE ASIAN
HEARTLAND, at ix (2004).
43. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 196-244 (2007) (examining the promotion of decolonization and the
corresponding concept of sovereignty by the United Nations); GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT
POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES: UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER (2004) (explaining that the concept of sovereign equality has served to
disadvantage nations besides the "great powers"); Upendra Baxi, New Approaches to the
History of International Law, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 555 (2006) (analyzing Simpson and
Anghie's approaches).
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powers.44 Third-Worldism lenses complicate acts of reading the
normative mass (or, as radical critics would have it, the anomic mess)
named "international law"-its corpus, genera, and texts. Such readings
pose profound challenges to the "legalized hegemony" of the "Great
Powers" in relation to their Other (the enemy or the outlaw).45 The
collective presence of the non-Euro-American states and peoples poses
intransigent problems for the conventional divisions between "classical,"
"modern," and "postmodern" international law. No longer acceptable are
the lead stories, or the master narratives, that reductively emplot the
colonized and imperialized Third World peoples as "things,"
"trajectories," "vectors," and "objects" of power. Indeed, their fractured
radical collective agency often shakes the "ground beneath the feet" (in
Salman Rushdie's phrase) of many a corrupt national and global
sovereign and of the latter's hegemonic visions of unjust peace and just
war. Further, these readings make space for acknowledging the
multitudinous, yet specific, popular authorship of the norms and
standards of international law and human rights beyond the contingent
"necessities" of vertiginous diplomatic histories. Assiduously archived
remain the histories of peoples' resistance to "corporate
Neanderthalism" and the onward march of global capital from Agent
Orange and Bhopal to Ogoniland and beyond in ways that contribute to
a renaissance of contemporary international law. Thus, upon
overcoming the initial post-traumatic disorders that arise from
juxtaposing, in stark terms, Kofi Anan and Ken Sari Wiwa, we also
begin to perceive the sites of international law as spaces for endless
negotiation of the radical popular authorship of international law.
The Third World has different avatars but, phoenix-like, Third
Worldism remains the resurrection of people's struggles and histories.
The crucial point here concerns the histories and futures of
"compossibility" (to evoke Leibniz) 46 of the different orders of
authorships. Manifestly, the constantly changing landscapes of Third
World intrusions on classical and modern paradigms of international
law complicate analysis and evaluation. Third Worldism as a history of
mentality, as an embodied experience and wisdom, and as a political
consciousness lives on even as the Second World has vanished, the
44. See generally Upendra Baxi, What May the 'Third World'Expect from International
Law?, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 713 (2006) (examining the meaning of the terms "Third World"
and "international law').
45. Although the term is capable of many interpretations, see particularly, SASKIA
SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES
(2006); JOSt MEDINA, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RESISTANCE: GENDER AND RACIAL EPISTEMIC
INJUSTICE, AND THE SOCIAL IMAGINATION (2013).
46. See Upendra Baxi, Chhatrapti Singh and the Idea of a Legal Theory, 56 J. INDIAN
L. INST. 5, 14 (2014).
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Third World is disappearing, and the Fourth World of indigenous
peoples acquires unusual salience in international law and relations.
The gifted raconteurs of a new "ontological terrain of globalization"
in the Empire, as Hardt and Negri rightly maintain, insist that the
once-upon-a-time framing category of "the Third World" now becomes
otiose because the "spatial divisions of the three worlds ... have been
scrambled so that we continually find the First World in the Third, the
Third in the First, and the second almost nowhere at all."47 This
observation also programs encyclopedic varieties of genesis amnesia.
Long before the "three worlds" categorization attained descriptive
prominence, this scrambling48 had already occurred through the
formative practices of colonialism and imperialism themselves, which
inextricably inserted the First World of (insufficiently) civilized nations
into the world of subjugated and oppressed colonial peoples. Further, as
is well known, the enforced diasporas of the laboring classes under
conditions of slavery or slave-like labor made the old empire fully viable,
even as they now also serve the ends of the new Empire.
The ever-proliferating literature concerning the "Third World"
remains rife with two deft conceptual and narrative moves. The first
consists of denying that there ever existed a so-called Third World.
Ironically, such denial raises, faute de mieux, radical doubts concerning
the existence of the old and new First and Second Worlds. The second
move concedes the fragmented historical reality of the Third World,
especially during the many phases of the Cold War, but articulates deep
disappointment with "Third Worldism" 49 as "failed decolonization."5 0 At
any rate, Third Worldism stands now presented as an ideological
configuration that self-destructs in an era of the new Empire. How far
hyperglobalization is a "war on plurality" (as Bourdieu suggested in a
47. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 363, xiii (2000).
48. See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: WHITE MAN'S
CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1992) (explaining the colonial
forces' "scramble" into Africa and "scramble" out of Africa).
49. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 47, at xiii, 263-64; Kevin C. Dunn, Africa's
Ambiguous Relation to Empire and Empire, in EMPIRE'S NEW CLOTHES: READING HARDT
AND NEGRI 143 (Paul A. Passavant & Jodi Dean eds., 2004) (critiquing Hardt's and Negri's
narrative in Empire as exhibiting core elements of Eurocentric thought).
50. See GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLoNIAL REASON:
TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT 358-63 (1999); see also VIVEK CHIBBER,
POSTCOLONIAL THEORY AND THE SPECTER OF CAPITAL 249-54 (2013) (analyzing
Chatterjee's analysis of anticolonial nationalism, pointing to the western influence and
maintenance of power even after decolonization). But see Terry Eagleton, In the Gaudy
Supermarket, LONDON REV. BOOKS, May 13 1999, at 3-6 (1999) (critiquing SPIVAK, A
CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT
(1999)).
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classic article in Le Monde)51 and how far it authorizes the politics of
identity is a question awaiting an answer; so too is the vexed
relationship between claims of justice and those of identity.5 2 It is not
possible here to trace the ideological itineraries of "identity" at its
various decomposing sites, including struggles for self-determination
and against imperial postcolonial state-building, as well as contestation
over development planning, constitutionalism, and governance (which
comprises the politics of mass protest against economic, foreign, and
defense policies). From the days of Panchshila to the post-Doha
Development Round moment, this ideology presents itself in different
historical contexts. Yet metanarratives continue to present its unity in
terms of some key characteristics.
A third, and related, move insists on the mimetic rather than
originary character of the practices forming the decolonization and anti-
imperial struggles. Thus, postcolonial discourse is often viewed as a
"derivative discourse" which remains "original" only as a deviation from,
or as a corruption of, classical European liberal political theory.
53
Against this mimetic reading of Third Worldism, I propose a reading
that accentuates its originary character. This stands crystallized in a
world-historical norm that first ousted, and then normatively outlawed,
the claims of divine right to empire by conquest and belligerent
occupation. It also gave rise to new normative conceptions of
constitutionalism as a set of relationships among four distinct but
related notions: governance, rights, development, and justice. No state
formation (conceived here as a politically organized moral community)
ever fully achieves a right balance among these four notions; what
remains important is the initial vitality of this discursive pursuit that
modifies both the received liberal and socialist heritage.
De-emphasizing the mimetic and elevating the original nature of
Third Worldism still needs to confront the difficult distinction between
"emancipation" and 'liberation." Emancipation refers merely to the
"entry of new nations and peoples into the imperial society of control,
with its new hierarchies and segmentations," whereas "liberation" refers
to the processes of "destruction of boundaries . . . reappropriation of
space, and the power of the multitude to determine the global
circulation and mixture of individuals and populations."54 From this
51. See Vincent B. Leitch, Bourdieu Against the Evils of Globalization, 9 SYMPLOKE
161, 161-164 (2001).
52. See BAXI, supra note 15, for a related discussion of the human rights dimension.
53. See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A
DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE? 39-43 (1986) (defining the nature of discourse in the postcolonial
world).
54. HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 47, at 363.
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perspective, then, the "destruction" of Third Worldism portends a time
when "the most wretched of the earth become the most powerful
beings."55 However, this incredibly Empire-stylized discourse wants
several reality checks.56 Myrdal brought home the venality and
corruption of postcolonial South Asian governing elites, as if this were
an independent causal variable. The Castells trilogy shifts the scenario,
in part, with some grounded overviews of the histories of postcolonial
African state formation, largely enriched by the distinction between
state-formative practices of prebendalism and those of the predatory
state.57 Prebendalism (signifying here the "concentration of political
power at the top," "political patronage," and "systematic government
corruption") remains expediently thought of as a signifier of the Third
World, and now of the fatefully recomposed Second World. However, in
the full gaze of the comparative sociology of governance, this illustrates
the universal flourishing of the corrupt sovereign. The heady mix of
prebendalist state formations marks the narratives of the Third World,
and the old and new Second World formations, in all their fatal regime
fascination towards state predation understood as "ruthless"
governmental repression. Careful scholarship remains precociously
uncertain about the origins of this potent "combinatory mix." Put
another way, the obituary writers of the Third World and Third
Worldism do not quite help us to decipher the legacy of the deeply
mercantilist practices of colonial occupation and "governance," or the
various histories of the Cold War, as coequal constitutive features of all
the three Worlds.55
55. Id.
56. See generally ROBERT J. C. YOUNG, POSTCOLON1ALISM: AN HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION (2001). Arguably, the two germinal trilogies-first, 1-3 GUNNAR MYRDAL,
ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NATIONS (1968), which inaugurated the
discourse concerning the "soft states," and second, 1-3 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE
INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (1999), which inaugurated the
discourse concerning the "information age"-need to be supplemented by Immanuel
Wallerstein-inspired world system genre. See YOUNG, supra note 56, at 110-12.
57. See, e.g., Peter Lewis, From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of
Decline in Nigeria, 34 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 79 (1996) (explaining the history of Nigeria's
economic policy, the changing nature of its political domination, and the implications for
the nation's economy).
58. This is now seen in the unfolding histories of the two "terror" wars. See Upendra
Baxi, The "War on Terror" and the 'War of Terror" Nomadic Multitudes, Aggressive
Incumbents, and the "New" International Law: Prefatory Remarks on Two "Wars", 43
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 7, 9-10, 34-43 (2005). Without denying considerations of collective
human security in counter-insurgency operations, it can be maintained that global and
national governance practices amid the two "terror" wars now unfortunately celebrate the
status of "rogue," "outlaw," or "enemies of civilization" regimes and even communities of
peoples-as if these states, societies, and peoples alone and singularly answered this
description!
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In place of the old global Southern solidarity, there now exist
regional arrangements to harvest the benefits of contemporary
globalization. In fact, large regional economic actors, arrangements, and
networks now flourish which find irksome the earlier identity common
to Third World nations. A division has emerged between the developed
developing countries and the less developed ones, reinforced by the
scattered hegemonies of the international financial institutions,
multinational corporations, the "discipline and punish" regimes of First
World human rights diplomacy, and the privatization of development
aid. The intellectual and activist fatigue with Third Worldism is
accompanied by a new creationist discourse celebrating the "rise of the
Fourth World."
The appropriative move in Manuel Castells remains hugely
instructive. In its inceptive or conceptive moment, "the Fourth World"
articulated the voices of suffering, and rightlessness, of the indigenous
peoples of the earth (some already facing extinction) that so vitally
critique forms of colonial, postcolonial, and postmodern state
predation.5 9 In Castells, two textual moves accomplish the emptying of
the "geopolitical meaning" of the Third World. The first is the
emergence of the Fourth World under conditions of informational
capitalism, as "multiple black holes of social exclusion throughout the
planet.'60 Second, the "power" of "identity politics" spills over the
various fractured historic notions of minority rights to many different
estates of struggle.61 The passional logics and emotional intelligence of
peoples in struggle and communities of resistance remain obscured in
state-centric critiques of Third Worldism. Nevertheless, the
contributions of Third Worldism to international law, international
organizations, and international relations are immense and ongoing.
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CONCLUSION
It may be argued that if there ever was a Third World, it does not
exist anymore. It may never have existed in the first place. However, it
is said to have dissipated today after the end of the Cold War and the
advent of globalization and neoliberalism. Despite many flickers of the
old Third World solidarity, that World does not exist today as a
counterhegemonic bloc exercising any normatively disproportionate
influence in reshaping international law, relations, and organization.
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60. See id. at 164.
61. See id. at 164-65.
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But there is little doubt that Third Worldism (as I describe it) as a state
of consciousness does exist. Rather than representing the voices of
political elites and states, Third Worldism is increasingly found in
insurgent social movements of the impoverished in the global South and
North alike. The impoverished rise in protest against deprivations and
denials of basic human rights both against the national states and the
international community, and however short-lived they are, these
struggles affect the structures of dominant power and governance.63 We
encounter a greater difficulty with regard to the first theme-law as an
instrument of the production of places of human rightlessness. If it is a
geographical truism that the production, distribution, and consumption
of places and spaces is the primary function of the law, then we must
also concede that any act of lawmaking, whether colonial, postcolonial,
or neocolonial, can contribute to the creation of new geographies of
injustice. Further, we must not shy away from the fact that the liberal
legal formation is as much about the provision of collective human
security as it is about controlling the production of space. However,
conceding this geographic and juristic truism does not mean that the
places thus produced as objects of governmentally and "development"
preclude alternate imaginations of legality and justice.
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